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The article presents the results of an empirical study on the current framework conditions for civil society
organizations in Austria. The results are linked to findings on how authoritarian governments deal with civil
society. The research shows that along with the current government’s gradual process towards right-wing pop-
ulism and authoritarianism, the general political climate has changed with regard to civil society, possibilities
of political participation, and the public financing of civil society organizations. The findings are linked to the
concept of civil society capture and reflect the overall wave of autocratization discussed by other authors. The
analysis of the gradual process of the development of authoritarian politics in a relatively stable and developed
democracy reveals the relevance of the findings for current tendencies in many other countries.
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1 Introduction
Authoritarian regimes rarely tend to emerge through military coups or other forms of massive violence, but
rather in a creeping process of often small steps. In this process, critical civil society and independent civil
society organizations (CSOs) are often among the first targets of authoritarian parties and governments. The
question posed in this paper is how right-wing populist governments treat civil society and if their politics can
be characterized as authoritarian. The theoretical basis is the model of civil society capture. With a focus on
civil society, the model describes the process towards authoritarian regimes and postulates understanding the
populist modification of civil society as an indicator for autocratization (Moder and Pranzl 2019).
The paper uses empirical data from an investigation in Austria to illustrate the hypothesis that right-wing
populist parties tend to pursue authoritarian policies by restricting the potential scope of action of critical seg-
ments of civil society. Austria was ruled by a right-wing populist coalition from 2017 to 2019. This paper ex-
amines how the framework conditions for civil society organizations changed during this period, thereby illus-
trating the model of civil society capture for developed democracies. The findings from a study conducted in
2019 are compared with the findings from a study conducted in 2014.
Civil society´s contributions to democracy, trust and social welfare can best be realized under adequate
political framework conditions. A current study in eight European countries shows that CSOs are significantly
more resilient when there are favourable conditions and cooperation with the state in the respective country is
good (Pape et al. 2019). Apart from general civil rights, opportunities for participation in legislative procedures,
the government’s informationpolicy, the quality of thewelfare state andpublic financial support for civil society
organizations play an important role. As populist and right-wing governments are gaining influence in many
countries, the conclusions of this paper should be of interest beyond the specific case.
The paper is organized as follows: First, it introduces the theoretical background, the country-specific con-
text and the methodology. Based on that, it presents the findings, and relates them to the current discussion.
Ruth Simsa is the corresponding author.
© 2019 Simsa published byDeGruyter.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Public License.
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2 Theoretical Background: The Crisis of LiberalDemocracies andConsequences for
Civil Society
At present, the framework conditions for civil society are becoming harsher in many countries. Already in the
last decade, the privatization of social tasks has led to an overall erosion of social stability (Zimmer 2014). The
tension between mission and market (Sanders 2015) seems to be increasingly dissolving in favour of market
logic. Organizations oriented towards the common good are increasingly met with scepticism (Greiling 2014).
As right-wing populist parties gain power, this situation is undergoing a new turn in many countries: civil
society participation is being restricted politically.
The model of liberal, representative democracy is in crisis worldwide (Ágh 2015; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018;
Mounk 2018; Schmitter 2015;Urbinati 2016).Numerous indicators of democracy anddemocratization have been
declining for about a decade. The influential “Freedom in the World” Index of the US organization Freedom
House, for example, reported in 2019 for the twelfth year in a row a deterioration of the global democratic
situation (Freedom House 2008, 2019). Even in the consolidated democracies of Western Europe and North
America, a marked decline in confidence in political institutions and political participation is being observed
(IDEA 2018).
One aspect of the crisis is the rise of (right-wing) populist parties and increasingly authoritarian govern-
ments that undermine democratic institutions and try to restrict civil rights.We find semi-authoritarian politics
in post-socialist countries (Kover 2015; Krasztev and van Til 2015), but increasingly also in Western democ-
racies such as France, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Austria (Meyer 2016) and the United States
(Eikenberry 2019). The clarity of this trend has prompted researchers to speak of a “democratic rollback” (Di-
amond 2008), “democratic backsliding” (Bermeo 2016), or even a “third wave of autocratization” (Lührmann
and Lindberg 2018). At the latest, since the election of Donald Trump to US President in 2016, the debate about
the current “crisis of democracy” has also arrived in the media and public discourse. The International Center
for Not-for-Profit Law report “Closing Civic Space” on shrinking civic space gives a good overview of the
legal restrictions on civil society and shows, with focus on CSOs in critical development work, that an in-
creasing number of CSOs are faced with restrictions to fully exercising their internationally protected rights
(International_Center_for_Not-for-Profit_Law 2016).
The terms “populism” and “autocracy” or “authoritarianism” are often used together and sometimes even
synonymously (Freedom House 2008; Mounk 2018). This paper uses the terms as follows:
Populism is defined as politics that appeal to simple, archaic forms of identification such as “the people”
(Mouffe 2005) by rhetorically dividing society between the people and its other, suggesting simplified solutions
(Panizza 2005). The term “right-wing populism” refers to populism that is ethically, religiously or nationally
exclusive (Pelinka 2013). Authoritarianism is understood as anti-democratic, illiberal politics with a substan-
tial de-facto decline of core institutional requirements for electoral democracy, with fewer opportunities for
opposition (Lührmann and Lindberg 2018), and with a dominance of the government over most segments of
society (Bozóki 2015). There is systematic evidence that contemporary autocracies are typically electoral autoc-
racies (Cassani 2017); they come to power legally by democratic elections and “mainly use legal and gradual
strategies to undermine democracies” (Lührmann and Lindberg 2018, 23).
Right-wing populism and authoritarianism are related. Many authors stress the anti-pluralistic character of
right-wing populism (Mudde 2004; Müller 2017; Urbinati 2016) and thus its proximity to autocratic procedures
(Weyland 2018). Levitsky argues that populism is a major catalyst for the emergence of authoritarian politics
(Levitsky and Loxton 2013). Yet, many empirical studies refer to instable democracies, for instance, in Latin
America. Although global comparative data show a strong empirical link between the rise of populism and an
increase in democratic backsliding (Kyle and Mounk 2018), the relationship of populism and authoritarianism
in established democracies with strong institutions remains blurry.
Common features of right-wing populist parties are not only nationalism and racism (Loch and Norocel
2015), they also combine ethno-nationalist xenophobia with anti-political-establishment populism (Rydgren
2005). Problematic aspects are attempts to destabilize institutions, the adoption of aggressive narratives and
attitudes, and attempts to weaken all forms of protest and critique. Often, they go along with distinct anti-
welfare social policies (Bozóki 2015).
Regarding the relationship between authoritarianism and civil society, there is evidence that modern forms
of authoritarianism not only secure their power through censoring and harassing the media, restricting polit-
ical opponents and undermining the autonomy of election administration bodies, but also by restricting civil
society (Lührmann and Lindberg 2018, 8). Scholarly work shows that authoritarian regimes use complex meth-
ods to strategically influence, control and incorporate civil society (Froissart 2014; Gilbert and Mohseni 2018;
Greskovits 2015), arguing that they try to usurp the autonomy of the civil sphere (Gerő and Kopper 2013) or to
capture it (Kover 2015).
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In the development of authoritarian regimes, civil society is usually one of the first targets. Restrictions of
political rights and civil liberties are often among the first actions of populist-autocratic governments (Cassani
and Tomini 2019). In the development process of authoritarian regimes, strategies towards civil society usually
take place in different steps. First, discourse and narratives attempt to delegitimize those parts of civil society
that are critical of the government. To do this, right-wing populist parties do not need to be in government
already. The popularization of polarizing and delegitimizing narratives serves as an essential contribution to
the preparation of a political turnaround in their favour. The discourse of “us” and “them”, followed by sys-
tematic attacks is a clear symptom for polarization that characterizes populist strategies. Besides restrictions
for critical organizations, autocratic governments often establish and support networks of CSOs, which share
their basic values (Kover 2015). Second, participation in legislation and political debates is restricted, which is
the first manifestation of the implementation of authoritarian practices. Third, this is followed by changes at
policy level, in the course of which public funds are channelled along a polarization line from “good” to “bad”
civil society, and away from politically independent to dependent CSOs. Civil society is highly vulnerable es-
pecially in countries where CSOs are financially dependent on government funding (Van Til 2015). Fourth, the
legal framework conditions are changed, in particular, civic rights are restricted. This process is described as
civil society capture. Populists and early stage autocrats thus limit public contestation by restricting liberal and
pluralist CSO’s activities, on the one hand, while simultaneously fostering CSOs that represent the populists’
understanding of a loyal civil society (Moder and Pranzl 2019, 10).
Hungary’s government under Viktor Orbán, for example, not only massively restricted the independent
press, but also made the framework conditions for certain CSOs considerably more difficult. For example, or-
ganizations that receive funding from foreign institutions must register officially, which could potentially lead
to further restrictions. At the same time, the ruling Fidesz Party systematically built up “civic circles”, which in
a sense represent a loyal “civil society from the right” (Greskovits 2017). Civil society is captured both by the
state and the church (Kover 2015). Similar trends can be seen to varying degrees in numerous other countries
ruled by populists and autocrats. The Turkish government, for example, specifically promoted organizations
supporting the government agenda in the field of women’s work, while the critical part of civil society was
undermined (Doyle 2016, 2017). In Russia, foreign-financed and/or politically active CSOs are also affected by
an increasingly restrictive legal situation (Cheskin and March 2015). In a strategy of “civilized oppression”,
the state’s policy towards civil society is dual. Besides repression of activists, authorities institutionalized co-
operation with some CSOs. Combined with an increasing use of administrative and legal procedures for con-
trolling CSOs, this strategy has led to a growing depoliticization (Daucé 2014).
Research shows that the relationship of authoritarian regimes and contestation is complex. In part, illiberal
regimes do not only repress critique, sometimes they adopt to protest with strategically set frameworks: “Au-
thoritarian governments set the rules of the game, which are – consciously or not – accepted by activists who
are not aiming at radical regime change anymore.” (Froissart 2014, 220). Certainly, a common, and inherent
feature of populist strategies is the polarization of civil society, i. e. the construction of two antagonistic (civil)
social groups; aimed at delegitimizing political opponents and strengthening one’s own claim to power as the
“true representatives” of the people (Mudde 2004; Müller 2017). There is evidence that polarization plays an
important role in justifying authoritarian measures (Levitsky 2017).
3 Context andMethodology
In Austria, in recent years, there has been a turbulent development with regard to politics and civil society.
Following an increase in civil society involvement in the refugee crisis (Simsa 2017), polarization arose around
this issue. The tendency towards xenophobia had increased since the 1990s (Wallace 2003), but has now in-
tensified even more. Immigration and security dominated the political discussion. The 2017 National Council
election led to a coalition between the conservatives (ÖVP) and the right-wing national conservatives (FPÖ).
Both parties had launched a polarizing election campaign strongly focused on the refugee issue. The country
has a strong social-democratic tradition. After the Second World War, there were only a few periods without
the participation of the Social Democratic Party in government. From 1966 to 1970 there was an exclusively
conservative government, and from 2000 to 2006 there were two coalition governments of conservatives and
right-wing nationalists. Nevertheless, right-wing populism has a long tradition in Austria, with the FPÖ party
having right-wing extremist roots (Pelinka 2019). After the Social Democratic Party had supported neoliberal
policies for decades, causing it to largely lose its ideology as well as its core electorate, the refugee crisis inten-
sified xenophobic tendencies and there was a clear shift to right-wing populist parties by 2015, culminating in
the coalition of ÖVP and FPÖ in 2017.
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Based on the definitions above, this coalition can be characterized as right-wing populist. It presented simple
solutions to all kinds of classic social and economic problems, primarily by linking them to the asylum issue. It
represented exclusive concepts of solidarity (Hofmann et al. 2019), and “national” became the political primacy.
Society was polarized between good (autochthonous) and bad (immigrant) parts. Furthermore, an “anti-elite
rhetoric” dominated (Pelinka 2019).1 With the focus on civil society, the analysis will show that the government
also developed clear authoritarian strategies.
Traditionally, CSOs and civil society have been a vital part of Austria, with more than 122,000 CSOs pro-
viding welfare services, engaging in advocacy and strengthening community-building (Neumayr et al. 2017).
Social movements, particularly workers’, women’s and environmental movements have long traditions, yet, in
the last decades they did not act very provocatively – generally the countrymay be characterized as a consensus
democracy (Dolezal and Hutter 2007). In connection with the refugee crisis of 2015, there was a rise in politi-
cal civil society activism (Simsa et al. 2018). The political framework conditions for civil society organisations
in Austria have traditionally been comparatively good. CSOs are valued as an important part of welfare state
arrangements, there was a high degree of social stability and quite good relations between government and
CSOs (More-Hollerweger et al. 2014). Civic engagement may be assessed as high in Austria. Almost half of the
population (46 %) does some kind of volunteer work (Neumayr et al. 2017). About 5% of Austria’s paid work-
force is employed in the sector. At over 50 %, public funding accounts for the most relevant share of revenue
of the sector (Pennerstorfer, Schneider, and Badelt 2013), many CSOs receive a large share of their income from
public sources and provide social services in return.
The present study uses several sources of data. Firstly, literature and document analyses formed themethod-
ological basis. Secondly, between August 2018 and February 2019, a total of 53 interviews were conducted with
8 experts and 45 representatives of CSOs. Experts were lawyers and scholars of the field. The representatives
come from various fields of activity; 21 come from the social sector, 9 from the advocacy sector, 8 from arts and
culture, 3 from environment work, 3 from the representation-of-interests, 2 from the religions sector, 1 from
education and 1 from sports. Representatives of the CSOs were all managers. 15 respondents were managers
in umbrella organisations and were therefore able to give an overview of the entire area. The sample consisted
of 25 men and 28 women. 42 interviews were transcribed and coded according to key terms.
Thirdly, in February 2019, 310 CSO executives participated in a quantitative survey on changes in resources,
the climate and the legal situation. Fourthly, in March 2019, a representative survey on the perception of non-
profit organizations in the population was commissioned. The results achieved were discussed and reviewed
in two focus groups with altogether 34 CSO representatives. The investigation is an update of the Civil Society
Index conducted in 2014 (More-Hollerweger et al. 2014), therefore, current changes can also be analysed.
Both quantitative surveys widely support the findings from the in-depth qualitative investigation. In the fo-
cus groups, the validity of the findings and strategies for civil societywere discussed, but they did not addmuch
new information. Therefore, the presentation of the findings will refer mainly to findings from the interviews;
references to the quantitative surveys will be explicitly marked as such.
4 Findings
In the following, the findings will be presented by applying the model of civil society capture, which postulates
four basic steps in the development of authoritarian governments in relatively developed democracies. The first
step is the deliberate change of narratives, followed by financial restrictions for critical parts of civil society, by
financial restrictions for critical CSOs and by changes to the legal framework.
4.1 NarrativeAttempts toDelegitimize Critical Civil Society–“Climatically, It’s an Eruption.” (E39)
As suggested by the model of civil society capture, a clear polarization of discourse can be observed between
2014 and 2019. The delegitimization of civil society action takes place through the devaluation of its activities,
and also the increase in a generally negative, exclusionary rhetoric: “These expressions are used like NGO-madness
in the Mediterranean, (…) asylum industry (…). A certain enemy image of civil society organizations is being built up.”
(R07) There is a constant devaluation of certain civil society organizations, especially those that deal with vul-
nerable target groups. Also, their clientele is deprecated as “cheaters”, “asylum fraudsters” etc. A frequent
allegation is that CSOs only work for their own (profit) interest.
The concept of public benefit organizations is under pressure. “Helping isn’t at all cool anymore” (R17).
This goes hand in hand with the polarization of civil society into a desirable and an undesirable part: “There are
suddenly the good and the bad in civil society” (R07). From the perspective of the respondents, the basic consensus
on the importance of civil society seems to be eroding: “There was a basic consensus that we need this civil society.
4
Au
tom
ati
ca
lly
ge
ne
rat
ed
ro
ug
hP
DF
by
Pr
oo
fCh
eck
fro
m
Riv
er
Va
lle
yT
ec
hn
olo
gie
sL
td
DEGRUYTER Simsa
It’s an important corrective. (…) I no longer see this basic consensus in this form.” (R29) The population only partly
shares this view. In the representative survey, 81 % (2014: 88 %) attribute a high social value to CSOs. What
is remarkable, however, is the significant decline in this assessment among younger people up to 29 years, of
whom only 68 % still attach high or very high importance to CSOs (2014: 92 %). However, a large proportion of
all respondents take a critical view of CSOs, with 45 % agreeing with the statement that CSOs “have generally
lost their reputation recently” and that 20 % believe that NPOs “only serve to enrich themselves by the suffering
of others” (not surveyed in 2014).
The devaluation of civil society is systematically carried out by representatives of the two coalition parties
and is taken up and reinforced by a large part of the media. Further, CSOs and their representatives are more
frequently attacked directly by the government. The nature and severity of these attacks is new and is perceived
as a breach of taboo:
The verbal attacks have already become harsher (…) when Kurz (the Chancellor) moves Doctors Without Frontiers
in the direction of illegal refugee helpers. This was unthinkable in the Second Republic (…). And this is really a
taboo break, I think, because (…) this is the Federal Chancellor who legitimizes this (…) the attacks on the non-profit
sector or some of the organizations are getting harder. (R38)
There are also attempts to personally intimidate CSO representatives by the government and the administration
by threatening telephone calls, but also of legal action against CSO representatives. These are nothing funda-
mentally new, but, according to interviewees, have a different, more hostile character than in the past. Taken
together, clear strategies towards polarization of (civil) society are evident.
4.2 Restriction of Participation–“Weare at theBeginning of aMassive Shift Towards aDemocracy
without Participation,Without Inclusion.” (R10)
Also, the second step of the model of civil society capture, the restriction of participation, is reported unani-
mously by interviewpartners. Austria traditionally has had good relationships between civil society andpolitics
(Neumayr et al. 2017; Pennerstorfer, Schneider, and Badelt 2013). CSOs have engaged in dialogue with the gov-
ernment inmany areas and have often been involved in legislative processes. Even in the past, participationwas
not satisfactory for the CSOs, but with the new government there was a clear deterioration in the relationship
between civil society and politics. All respondents noticed a reduction in opportunities for participation in po-
litical decision-making processes: “So the government is now not interested in participation, cooperation or exchange.
(…) it is a completely different style, where a small group makes the central decisions and everything else is completely
insignificant.” (E38)
CSOs are largely and systematically excluded from legislative processes, there is hardly any dialogue be-
tween CSOs and the federal government or individual ministries: “No participation, no involvement, we only learn
many things from the media.” (R05) CSOs describe politics as increasingly authoritarian. A clear change is seen
in the practice of shorter legislative procedures, which leave little time for comments. “Deadlines which were pre-
viously customary (…) are no longer observed or no longer taken into account.” (R16) The review periods are set very
short, often over public holidays, and the motions for bills leave no room for discussion. The aim is obviously
to push through laws with little resistance, to get decisions “pushed through as quickly as possible. And there are as
few counter-statements as possible.” (R16) Specifically, regarding controversial topics, attention is “kept as low as
possible, to give as little time as possible to organize broader resistance.” (R09)
Further, the lack of contact persons in politics is often criticised. In the past, CSOs often had direct contacts
with ministries, appointments with ministers were possible and public hearings took place. Currently, repre-
sentatives of politics avoid any direct exchange with civil society. Politics has become less transparent and it
hardly communicates with civil society actors any more. Almost all respondents report something similar on
this point: “They don’t talk to us. They won’t talk to us. That’s the new thing. Until now, I’ve always had the feeling you
can still talk to someone.” (R03)
The large number of similar feedbacks reveals a systematic strategy to exclude civil society from political
decisions. Most respondents report that CSOs are rarely given attention anymore, that it is often extremely
difficult to maintain a dialogue. They simply don’t get answers. Often “there are actually no reactions” (R04), you
have to “call for months” (R20) or you get answers “which are incorrect” (R29). And this happens “across the sector,
whether it’s the environment, or culture” (R07).
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4.3 Cuts in Funding for Critical CSOs –“andThis is Actually Starvation. A Systematic Starvation of
Institutions.” (R18)
Austria’s civil society sector is predominantly funded by public sources: 50 % of the sector’s income is derived
from contracts with public authorities, while another 17 % comes from public subsidies (More-Hollerweger
et al. 2014; Pennerstorfer, Schneider, and Reitzinger 2015). The fields of healthcare, social services, culture,
research and development are specifically dependent on public funding sources. Regarding changes in the
period investigated, there are no reliable quantitative data on changes in funding to date. According to the
(non-representative) quantitative survey of CSO managers of our study, not much had changed regarding the
total amount of public funding of CSOs. Overall and in particular by international comparison, the financial
situation of most CSOs in Austria is relatively stable.
However, a detailed analysis shows that there are severe changes in funding that obviously affect critical and
diversity-oriented CSOs. Particularly in the areas of migration, arts, women, labour market and development
policy, these CSOs have experienced existentially threatening restrictions to public funding. A representative
of labour market organizations describes this: “This is already the second year of cuts. (…) now you can see how the
organizations are starting to close down.” (R04)
Massive cuts in the women’s sector, which primarily affect autonomous, critical and feminist institutions,
are described as an “ideological reconstruction” (R14) and as brutal: “This is something new. Well, I don’t think we’ve
ever experienced such brutality before.” (R23) Dramatic, existentially threatening cuts also affect critical CSOs in
the field of development education:
There are cuts (…) that affect some organizations (…) that simply can no longer continue. (…) many cuts are in
the so-called development education sector, i. e. in domestic work. It is traditionally rather critical and the cuts are
not erratic there. (R21)
In refugee and asylumpolicy, only part of the severe cuts can be explained by the decline in asylumapplications,
and in many cases, the care and integration of migrants is also affected, for example, as regards the integration
year, apprenticeship training and language teaching. Here, too, a systematic process is observed: “Massive break-
ins (…) in the refugee area, massive in legal advice, massive in integration measures. That is their central intention: We
don’t want any refugees (…) we actually don’t want integration at all.” (R10)
With these cuts, or even their threat, the aim is to prevent criticism:
This is, so to speak, a lever, so how do I take the money from them, how do I cut it, so that I silence these voices
(…) either because I cut them completely off or they no longer exist, or because, under threat of cuts, I silence them.
(R09)
Although there are thus far no clear quantitative data on systematic changes in funding, the qualitative analysis
points to systematic cuts in those areas that belong to the parts of civil society that are characterized as “evil” in
the polarizing narratives of the populist parties. These are actors that are critical to government or active in dis-
liked fields of activity, such as immigration, feminism, critical art, and that overall do not fit into the dominant
ideology. The strong ideological orientation of funding cuts is new. With regard to funding from the public
sector, the 2014 survey found that financial conditions were made more difficult, such as a lack of index adjust-
ments, a lack of planning security or excessive bureaucracy, but no systematic discrimination against critical
organisations (More-Hollerweger et al. 2014). Another facet that is characteristic is the existential character of
ideologically motivated funding cuts; although some of the cuts were not so dramatic in quantitative terms, for
the affected CSOs they were critical for their survival.
4.4 Changes in Legal Framework– “Regarding FreedomofAssembly, TheRestrictions areObvious…
” (R20)
The fourth step postulated by the model of civil society capture are restrictions to civil rights. Generally,
fundamental rights are well developed in Austria by international standards (Freedom House 2014; More-
Hollerweger et al. 2014). However, the freedom of assembly has been restricted in recent years, particularly
by the extension of the notification period for assemblies and the establishment of so-called protected zones.
The indirect effects in practice on the exercise of fundamental rights are increased bureaucracy and restricted
legal certainty:
Regarding the freedom of assembly (…) that the fact that you now have to register earlier. (…) you can tell it’s
getting tighter. (…) with it we are much better verifiable or handy. Or it’s easier to intervene and say you can’t.
(R16).
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Overall, the legal framework did not change significantly during the period under review. However, intervie-
wees reported a tendency towards a more unfavourable application of current laws. Furthermore, CSOs are
also indirectly affected by the stricter legislation applicable to their clients, for example, in immigration and
social law.
5 Impact on Civil Society
These policies created pressure and polarization, and many interviewees report significantly increased work-
loads (e. g. for correcting false reports, dealing with court reports, obtaining information, fund-raising). The
CSOs experience polarization in the population, in politics and the media. It requires a greater effort to justify
social work due to the dogma that the needy are to blame themselves. The effects on civil society are often un-
certainty and increased personal pressure: “But in principle there is already a climate of fear in all kinds of situations,
of no longer saying these things. Yes, fear, insecurity and just a big insecurity overall.” (R16) Employees of the CSOs
are affected by this. For some, the changes in the climate are partially delegitimizing their work, lowering the
attractiveness of their profession and adding personal burdens. Employees who a few years ago were proud of
their work are criticised as “do-gooders”: “You need a certain mindset, because you don’t want to lose your nerve. And
all those who are a little vulnerable (…) they start to look around for something else.” (R04) According to respondents,
attacks in the social media have also become worse in recent times. “It also occupies us (…) and of course it also
hurts and it hurts when you read something like that.” (R05) In order not to expose themselves to hatred in social
media, some people, often women, withdraw from digital communication channels.
The reactions of civil society to the current situation are manifold. The spectrum ranges from defensive
behaviour, such as waiting, being inconspicuous and endurance, to new forms of resistance, pro-active work
on alternative narratives, and increased solidarity. Some CSOs see the changed climate as a phase that needs
to be survived as undamaged as possible. This implies to spare one’s own strength, to wait and see, and to
preserve what already exists. As a precaution, demonstrations, for example, are not advertised or less criticism
is levelled at the government. However, many interviewees report a strengthening of solidarity, a new “fighting
spirit” and new mobilizations expressed in creative forms of protest. Civil society has “grown together” in a
common struggle for democracy: “I have the impression that actors who would otherwise not express themselves so
strongly politically are increasingly saying that borders have been crossed here. This is where I have to speak.“ (R45) In
response to the verbal delegitimization of civil society and its clients, respondents see the need to establish
positive counter-narratives: “I believe that it is of crucial importance to hear some other narratives (…) how do we want
change, how do we want to live together, how can a society be that does not polarize.” (R10) Many also emphasize the
importance of criticism and resistance: “The most important thing is not to remain silent, the most important thing is
to continue (…) this civil disobedience.” (R34)
6 Conclusion andDiscussion
This paper analyses how right-wing populist governments treat civil society. It builds on the model of civil
society capture that argues that restrictions to critical civil society by right-wing populist governments reflect a
process of autocratization. There is evidence for the relation of right-wing populism to authoritarianism (Wey-
land 2018). Literature further shows that a crucial aspect of authoritarian politics are restrictions on critical civil
society (Lührmann and Lindberg 2018).
Nevertheless, most empirical evidence of how authoritarian regimes treat civil society refers to unstable
democracies (Levitsky 2017). Thus far, the facets of early state authoritarianism and its effects on civil society in
well-developed democracies are an under-researched, yet currently highly important topic. The model of civil
society capture argues that in the process of the development of authoritarian governments, civil society faces
delegitimization, restrictions to participation, politically motivated cuts in funding for critical and independent
organizations, and ultimately, restrictions to fundamental civic rights.
Based on data from 2018 and their comparison with a civil society index study from 2014, the paper empiri-
cally analyses changes in the framework conditions of civil society in Austria. The country has awell-developed
democracy with traditionally strong links between civil society and the government, and relatively high levels
of civil society participation. From the end of 2017 to May 2019, Austria was ruled by a coalition government
that can be characterized as right-wing populist. The findings correspond to the patterns of civil society capture
known from literature. Specifically, the rhetoric polarization between the good and the bad segments of society
as well as drastic restrictions to political participation are all very clear. Further, cuts in public funding took
place immediately after the government came to power. They were not dramatic in absolute terms, but posed
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an existential threat to many critical organizations and led to general fear in the sector. All of these changes
can be interpreted as indicators of “autocratization”. In this development towards authoritarian politics, “pop-
ulists and early-stage autocrats are keeping a democratic façade while seriously undermining democratic prin-
ciples.” (Moder and Pranzl 2019, 10) Regarding changes in the legal environment, the assumptions underlying
the model of civil society capture are not clearly observable. The strengthening and functionalization of parts
of civil society that agree with the government (Van Til 2015) could also not yet be observed. This might be
an effect of the short duration of the respective government. In 2019, the coalition was suspended after only
1.5 years due to a severe scandal. This is in line with global data that show that populists often leave office
early and under dramatic circumstances (Kyle andMounk 2018). Nevertheless, taken together, as seen in coun-
tries that are more advanced in the process of autocratization (Bozóki 2015), immediately after taking office,
the government began to deconstruct democratic structures. Civil society was not the only sphere of society
affected.
As there is currently a rise of right-wing populist politics in many well-developed countries, these findings
may be of significance beyond the investigated case. Nevertheless, it must be taken into account that the steps
of civil society capture described are highly dependent on contextual factors such as the country´s history,
traditions of civil society and the respective welfare model in place. Literature shows that there are various,
increasingly hybrid manifestations of authoritarianism, which cannot be defined by an “overconcentration of
power and authority in the hands of a single party anymore, but rather by a subtle coexistence of elements
of democracy and authoritarianism” (Froissart 2014, 222). There are manifold ways of channeling contestation
towards largely de-politicized forms of participation (Geoffray 2014). The paper contributes to our knowledge
about these forms of capturing civil societies by early stage autocrats in one specific situation. Thus, research
on the various and often subtle forms of civil society capture in other democratic countries would complete the
empirical picture and give us more information on how the process of autocratization is working in different
contexts.
Notes
1 https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/interview-populismusforscher-oesterreich-sollte-eine-warnung-fuer-deutschland-sein-
1.3711357, accessed on 4.1.2019.
http://www.bpb.de/apuz/274253/rechtspopulismus-in-oesterreich-zur-entwicklung-der-fpoe?p=all, accessed on 4.1.2019.
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